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Abstract. The notion of ‘entanglement’ has been central to the development of the emerg-
ing perspective on sociomateriality in organizations. But employing a metaphor of entan-
glement implies an ontological commitment to treat social and material agencies as empiri-
cally inseparable. This commitment to inseparability makes it very difficult to think about 
redesigning systems to work better because they cannot be dismantled into their compo-
nent parts and re-arranged. Shifting from a metaphor of ‘engagement’ to one of ‘imbrica-
tion’ eliminates this problem because social and material agencies are seen to retain their 
distinctive form despite the fact that they depend on one another for the production and 
perpetuation of sociomaterial practices. Imbrications can be undone and remade. Thus, a 
designer can work with an imbricated structure in a way he or she cannot with an entangled 
web of practice. The result is that the metaphor of imbrication provides more possibilities 
for imagining design-oriented action and more opportunities for envisioning changes to 
technologies and organizations than does a metaphor of entanglement without sacrificing 
the relational ontology that makes the sociomaterial perspective so attractive to scholars.   
Comment to Bratteteig & Verne
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The emerging perspective on sociomateriality has a number of benefits for research on the man-
agement of technology in organizations. One of these benefits is that it by defining technologies 
and organizations in the same way—as constellations of social and material agencies—organiza-
tions and information systems scholars can finally dispense with debates about technological VS 
social determinism because they conceptualize technology and organization as different abstrac-
tions of the same underlying phenomena �Leonardi �00��. � second benefi t is that discuss-
ing organizational practices as ‘sociomaterial’ reminds researchers that technology is not only 
important during times of implementation, but that the affordances tools provide people for 
conducting work tasks are part of that work and, consequently, central to all organizational pro-
cesses �Orlikowski �007�. � third benefit is that the term ‘materiality’ �even if it is compounded 
with the pre-fix “socio”� draws attention to the substance and significance of the artifacts with 
which people work. � long-standing complaint of information systems scholars has been that 
researchers who purport to focus on how technologies are implicated in organizational action 
do not describe the technologies they study in any depth, which precludes detailed theorizing 
about their role in the production and maintenance of organizational practice (Monteiro and 
Hanseth 1995).
This last benefit—re-focusing attention on the materiality of the tools with which people 
work—is especially important if one wishes to take a design orientation to organizational analy-
sis. By design orientation we mean conducting research that not only allows us to describe 
organizational processes, but to generate insights about how to improve them �cf., Hevner et al. 
�004�. The reason this focus on materiality supports a design orientation is because it is through 
an understanding of how the features and functionality of a technological artifact are activated 
in the context of use and enable and constraint specific ways of organizing practices and policies 
that researchers can begin to see how using technology differently might improve people’s lives. 
This focus, and the design orientation that undergirds it, is clearly advocated in Bratteteig and 
Verne’s ��01�� study of the technologies and organizational policies that enable and constraint 
the estimation of tax payments in Norway. �s the authors argue, unless researchers �and maybe 
tax collectors!� are able to break the ‘sociomaterial’ down into the ‘social’ and the ‘material,’ there 
may be little hope for designing better technologies and organizations that meet people’s needs. 
Despite the attention to a technology’s form and function that the term ‘material’ in the 
word ‘sociomaterial’ encourages, at least one of the underlying ontological positions that has 
buoyed the emerging sociomaterial perspective threatens this focus. The concept of ‘entangle-
ment,’ which is drawn, somewhat loosely, from the meta-theoretical stance of agential realism 
�Barad, �003�, belies any distinction between the social and the material—this is why Orlikows-
ki and Scott ��008� suggested that the term should not even include a hyphen. �lthough upon 
first glance the notion of ‘sociomaterial entanglement’ would not seem to jeopardize a focus on 
materiality, a closer inspection reveals several problems. 
�s Leonardi ��01�b� suggests, sociomaterial researchers typically invoke the entanglement 
as a starting point. That is, researchers begin by assuming that practices are sociomaterial and 
move forward from there to show how an inextricable relationship between social norms and 
a technology’s materiality shapes, produces, or changes, organizational action. � metaphor of 
entanglement suggests that there is no untangling to be done, not because untangling is hard 
�think of the image of a tightly bound knot of two pieces of rope�, but because conceptually 
there is nothing to untangle – the sociomaterial is one thing, not two �there is only one piece of 
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rope�. Bratteteig and Verne’s ��01�� suggest, that such a view of entanglement is demotivating 
when viewed from, and perhaps antithetical when applied to, a design orientation. �s they sug-
gest in reference to citizen frustration about the estimation of taxes using the eGovernment tool: 
“Seeing sociomaterial assemblages as inseparable, unsolvable entanglements can lead the citizen 
to give up, and not make any move towards disentangling” �p. 68�. If things cannot be broken 
apart, they cannot be reassembled in different and perhaps better ways. Consequently, any focus 
on the ‘material’ that a sociomaterial perspective might appear to give becomes useless if the goal 
is to design better systems, like the eGovernment technology used in the Norwegian Tax �gency 
described by Bratteteig and Verne. 
To reclaim the power of design, Bratteteig and Verne suggest moving away from a conceptu-
alization of sociomaterial practices as inextricable ‘entanglement’ to a view of sociomaterial prac-
tice as a space in which human and material agencies are ‘imbricated’ �Leonardi �011�.  Their 
argument is that the metaphor of ‘imbrication’ is better suited to a design orientation than the 
metaphor of ‘entanglement’ because imbricated structures, although appearing seamless from 
a healthy distance, are nothing more than interlocked patterns of distinct elements when seen 
close up. In other words, a practice that looks ‘sociomaterial’ from overhead seems much more 
‘social’ and ‘material’ on the ground. Bratteteig and Verne suggest that if organizational practices 
are seen as imbricated as opposed to entangled, they can then be taken apart �because there are 
two pieces of rope, not just one� and their constituent components �human and material agen-
cies� each can be modified and then reassembled in different ways to improve people’s experi-
ences. To explain the importance of this point, we turn to a brief discussion of the differences 
between entanglement and imbrication and the consequent ideological commitments entailed 
in choosing one metaphor over the other.
1 Entanglement vs. imbrication
Drawing on work in the philosophy of science and technology studies, Orlikowski ��010, p. 13� 
observes that most approaches to technology in organizations follow an “ontology of separate-
ness,” which posits two independent entities—the social and the material—that then are related 
to each other. By contrast, Orlikowski claims that in the beginning is the mangle, and that it 
makes no sense to ask for a demarcation between the material and the social: “It would not be 
incorrect to say that our existence has now become so entangled with the things surrounding us 
�if it even makes sense to use the notion of ‘surround’� that it is no longer possible to say, in any 
definitive way, where we end and they begin, and vice versa” �Introna �00�, p. �6; quoted in 
Orlikowski �010, p. 13�. This approach, and the relational ontology it implies, is based on Niels 
Bohr’s ‘philosophy-physics,’ �Barad 1��8�, which suggests that we need to discard the basic as-
sumptions of measurement transparency that underlie Newtonian Physics; in other words, “that 
observation-independent objects have well-defined intrinsic properties that are representable as 
abstract universal concepts.” �Barad 1��8, p. �4�. Bohr claimed that what was known could in 
no way be separated from the “agencies of observation,” and that both factors formed a “non-
dualistic whole,” which constituted the cul-de-sac beyond which knowledge could not proceed. 
Hence, as Barad �1��6, p. 170� who has translated and championed Borh’s work for the social 
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sciences suggests,  “there is no unambiguous way to differentiate between the ‘object’ and the 
‘agencies of observation’—no inherent/naturally occurring/fixed/universal/Cartesian cut exists. 
Hence, observations do not refer to objects of an independent reality.” What is being described 
is our participation within nature, not nature itself. Barad entangles epistemological and onto-
logical considerations, such that what something becomes inseparable from the process through 
which we come to know it. �s a consequence, the entanglement in practice view privileges 
“neither humans nor technologies…, nor does it treat them as separate and distinct realities.” 
�Orlikowski �010, p. 1��.  
We sympathize with Barad’s and Orlikowski’s push to discard a representational approach 
to epistemology �and its associated ontological commitments�. There is no ready-made world 
out there because there is no one-to-one mapping of objects to ideas �Putnam 1�81�. Thinking 
of the world as composed of logical atoms and of language as a representation thereof, is simply 
untenable. �s Wittgenstein argued against his own ‘Picture Theory of Meaning,’ language can-
not mirror reality because our uses of a particular words share only a ‘family resemblance’ to each 
other, and the grammatical form in which those words are embedded may change without any 
alteration in the expression of thought �Wittgenstein 1�53�. The meaning of a word does not 
consist in its relation to some atomic fact; rather, the meaning of a word lies in its use within the 
language game of a community. For this reason, no account of an object or event can be proven 
to be its ‘one true’ description. What we find instead are different descriptions of reality that can 
be proven to be better or worse �Putnam 1��7�. 
� key tenet of the entanglement approach is its consideration of the identity/difference with 
its all-or-nothing view of our access to reality. Barad ��003, p. 80�� puts it bluntly: 
“[D]uring the nineteenth century, Nietzsche warned against the mistaken tendency to 
take grammar too seriously: allowing linguistic structure to shape or determine our un-
derstanding of the world, believing that the subject and predicate structure of language 
reflects a prior ontological reality of substance and attribute. The belief that grammatical 
categories reflect the underlying structure of the world is a continuing seductive habit of 
mind worth questioning.”
We contend, however, that more alternatives to representationalism exist than the holism 
espoused by Barad, Itrona and Orlikowski, among others. The fact that grammar may not map 
perfectly to reality does not mean that it should be discarded. We agree with Suchman ��007�, 
that technology acquires its meaning when embedded in social practice and, therefore, in rela-
tion to both the agent�s� involved and other material elements. � relational view of technology 
need not dissolve the difference between these two poles. The distinction that Kenny �1���� 
provides between the power of a physical key to open a door and the vehicle of that power 
affords a first glimpse into our approach. Imagine a key that has the power to open one door 
and only that door. �lthough that power is certainly real, we would be wrong to look for the 
actual power in the key itself, as this power is clearly relational, at least in two senses. First, It is 
relational in the sense that, absent the door, the key loses its power; and, second, it is relational 
because the key acquires its meaning only in the context of a community in which keys and 
doors exist and people are trained at opening doors with keys. Indeed one could point to certain 
physical characteristics of the key and say that the power lies in, for example, its shape and com-
ponent material—that is, in its ‘materiality,’ in Leonardi’s ��01�� terms. But that move would 
4
Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 24 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://aisel.aisnet.org/sjis/vol24/iss2/4
Sociomateriality as a lens for design • 83
only constitute one instance of what Lukes ��005� calls the ‘vehicle fallacy’, which consists of 
confounding vehicle and power. In Lukes’ own words,
This idea has led sociologists and military analysts, for example, to equate power with 
power resources, such as wealth and status, or military forces and weapons. But having 
the means of power is not the same as being powerful. �s the United States discovered in 
Vietnam and postwar Iraq, having military superiority is not the same as having power…
[C]ounting power resources can be a clue to [power’s] distribution, but power is a capac-
ity, and not the… vehicle of that capacity �Lukes �005, p. 70�.
Similarly, although the key’s retains its materiality does not imply that it retains its power, 
as they are two distinct entities, material and relational, respectively. In other words, the power 
that the key has to open the door is afforded by the materiality of both the key and the door, but 
is not equivalent to either or both of them. Rather, it is an emergent power that inheres in the 
relationship between the two relata. This example illustrates how a relational ontology need not 
negate any real separation between entities. 
If the quest is for a relational ontology that respects and interrelationship, but not a conflat-
ing of social and material agencies, then the metaphor of imbrication becomes a useful alterna-
tive to the metaphor of entanglement �Leonardi �011�. The verb “to imber” derives from a kind 
of Greek and Roman tile, known as imbrex (from imber, “rain”�, used in combination with other 
kind of tile called “tegula”. Imbrices were laid out so that one slightly overlapped the next one, in 
the same way as the scales of a fish, thereby channeling the rain over the tegulae, and off the roof. 
In the same way as imbrices and tegulae differ in their constituent make-up, so too do social and 
material agencies. “Though both [are] capabilities for action, [they] differ phenomenologically 
with respect to intention. Thus, like the tegula and the imbrex, they have distinct contours and 
through their imbrication they come to form an integrated organizational structure” �Leonardi 
�011, p. 37�. Social and material agencies do not always differ only analytically, like the concav-
ity and convexity of the line. This assumption flies in the face of structural arrangements that, 
although well known by agents, may be nonetheless constraining, like the internal structure of 
an ERP system, or the feebleness of a given mechanical tool. It seems obvious that, absent any 
other consideration, the structure of the ERP system is not a state of affairs that depends in its 
moment-by-moment existence on any entanglement with the agent, but to some extent imposes 
itself on agents as an external reality that both constrains and affords agents’ purposes.
More general examples may include the particular demographic structure of a country, 
which will differentially enable and constrain rates of population replacement, taxation schemes 
or education policies. The material entanglement approach, however, proscribes the option to 
analyze how it is exactly that agents and technology interact and form the patterned imbrica-
tions that we know as practices. We agree that the entanglement approach may serve well on 
some occasions. In Heidegger’s �1�6�� terminology, this metaphor may be useful for a ready-
to-hand mode of engagement, which arises when a tool is transparent to an agent and there is 
no perceived distance between technology and agent because the practice proceeds smoothly. In 
those cases one experiences action as unmediated. When this transparency of action is broken, 
though, the experience turns into what Heidegger �1�6�� terms unready-to-hand or present-
at-hand modes of engagement. The differences between them need not detain us here. In these 
latter circumstances, the entanglement metaphor looses its explanatory power because technol-
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ogy appears more as a topic of investigation in the way that Mouzelis’ critiques Giddens’ �1�84� 
structuration theory for treating technologies “as topics, not so much as means of acting but 
as strategic goals, as objects that the subject approaches with theoretical, critical or monitoring 
intent” ��000, p. 748�. 
Bratteteig and Verne’s analysis demonstrates the need to go beyond the discussion of whether 
there is or there is not a space between material and social agencies, and inquire into the mecha-
nisms through which material and social agencies become imbricated within that space. To 
provide one such lever, we suggest employing the concept of ‘conversation.’ To illustrate what we 
mean by a conversation between social and material agencies we will build on Galison’s �1��7� 
idea of the trading zone as the socially invented �as opposed to ‘constructed’� space in which 
imbrications takes place. In the following section we will further refine Leonardi’s ��011� use of 
the metaphor of imbrication by discussing how material and social agents come to form a dis-
persed, routinized web through person-to-person, person-to-material and material-to-material 
conversations.
2 Imbrication as conversation
Peter Galison’s �1��7� monumental chronicle of the evolution of microphysics in the twentieth 
century, illustrated as an interaction of communities of physicists with theoretical, experimental 
and practical constraints, is instructive because his concept of ‘trading zone’ shows precisely the 
working of the space between material and social agencies that we argued is necessary to under-
stand their interaction. Galison tells the convergent story of two different research traditions in 
microphysics, both concerned with the discovery of subatomic particles, but based, respectively, 
on running numerous experiments and their statistical analysis and on getting an image of them 
�or of their trace�. The progressive convergence of the two streams of research took place through 
the emergence of a ‘trading zone,’ where patches of theories were borrowed, and recombinations 
of existing instruments and experiments were made. This view contrasts with the ‘translation’ 
metaphor, which holds that there is a process through which meaning in the language of tradi-
tion � is replicated in the language of tradition B. Rather, the ‘trading zone’ image is that of a 
new, hybrid language created in a newly opened space that both parties come to share. In Gali-
son’s �1��7, p. 783� own words,
Two groups can agree on rules of exchange even if they ascribe utterly different signifi-
cance to the objects being exchanged; they may even disagree on the meaning of the 
exchange process itself. Nonetheless, the trading partners can hammer out a local coordi-
nation despite vast global differences. In an even more sophisticated way, cultures in in-
teraction frequently establish contact languages, systems of discourse that can vary from 
the most function-specific jargons, through semispecific pidgins, to full-fledged creoles 
rich enough to support activities as complex as poetry and metalinguistic reflection.
Central to the concept of trading zone, then, is the creation of more-or-less fine-grained 
languages that allow �and differentially� constrain interactions. If trading zones are spaces of 
conversation, then we can understand the sociomaterial imbrications that produce and sustain 
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microphysics as a conversation among the physicists active in each of the two traditions, and 
of the theories, experiments and tools embedded in those traditions. We need to understand 
‘conversation’ in this context in a broad sense, as existing, among others vehicles, in natural 
language, in theories �a specialized subset of language�, in experimental procedures and perfor-
mances, and in the use of tools. In �ristotelian terms—uncannily parallel to Galison’s analytical 
axes- we could claim that the kinds of signification that populate the trading zone can belong to 
the habits of theory (theoria), action (praxis� and technique �techné�. Conversations take place 
when, for example, patches of theories are borrowed, experiments are adapted to one’s tradition, 
or hybrid tools are built. Further, if we wish to understand the evolution of the ‘microphysics 
imbrication’ we need to realize that it is just the highest level of a nested set of conversations: 
between traditions, in the first place, but also between people, between people and technologies 
and among technologies themselves.
The trading zone, the more or less ample area between both physics traditions, is where 
the highest-order imbrications takes place, while more fundamental sociomaterial imbrications 
occur in the work practice that occur within specialty departments, and so on. Central to a con-
ception of the interaction of social and material agencies is Galison’s concept of ‘intercalated pe-
riodization,’ which depicts theorizing, experimenting and instrument usage as interacting with 
‘partial autonomy’ �Galison 1�87�. To illustrate, constraints on experimental inquiry may be 
long-, medium- and short-term. Whereas, for example, the idea of unification of fundamental 
forces of nature may make up a long-term constraint for experimental activities, gauge theories 
and different models and phenomenological laws used in particle physics constitute respectively 
medium and short-term constraints for the same field �Galison 1�87, p. �54�. Different kinds 
of constraints lead to different inputs into the dynamics of imbrication. These constraints are 
not ‘things’ and are surely activated by the goals the researchers have imposed on themselves; but 
it is also true that the material dynamics of tools are a different kind of beast than, for example, 
the theoretical commitments of the agents involved. The fact that constraints and affordances 
only appear as emergent phenomena when the relevant relata come about does not mean that 
they are prior temporally, logically, or ontologically than the relata.
The different nature of the imbricating elements appears most clearly in the periodization 
of the ‘microphysics imbrication.’ For Galison a period is a fragment of microphysics that can 
be identified as distinct from what precedes it and from what follows it. Different schools of 
thought have attributed change to different factors. Both positivists and antipositivists believed 
that science moved according to one and only one factor. Positivists, for example, “committed 
themselves to an unbroken, cumulative language of observation” �Galison 1��7, p. 784�. If posi-
tivists accorded empirical data the sole influence on the change in microphysics, antipositivists 
“argued that theoretical and linguistic changes of science shifted with the abruptness and totality 
of a gestalt switch �…�. Theory shifts forced changes all the way through experience, leaving no 
bit of language, theory or perception unaffected” �Galison 1��7, p. 7�0�. �gainst both positiv-
ists and antipositivists, Galison holds that periodizations are intercalated because of the partial 
relative autonomy of theory, practice and instrumentation:
First, it is at least tripartite, granting the possibility of partial autonomy to instrumen-
tation, experimentation and theory �…�. Second �…� there is no continuous basis for 
observation. �…� Third, the local continuities are intercalated –we do not expect to see 
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the abrupt changes of theory, experimentation, and instrumentation occur simultane-
ously; in any case it is a matter of historical investigation to determine if they do line 
up �…�. Fourth, we expect a rough parity among the strata –no level is privileged, no 
subculture is the arbiter of progress in the field or serves as the reduction basis (the inter-
calated strands should really be mapped in three dimensions to demonstrate that no one 
subculture is always ‘on top’ and that each borders on the other two�. Just as brick layers 
would not stack-set the bricks for fear the whole building would collapse, researchers try 
to set breaks in one practice cluster against continuities in others. �s a result of such lo-
cal actions �not global planning�, the community as a whole does not stack-periodize its 
practices. �Galison 1��7, p. 7��-800�
Taken together, the concepts of trading zone and intercalated periodization point us to the 
exploration of the expanse in which imbrications emerge out of the conversations among social 
and material agencies. 
3 Imbrication, conversation, and design
�s Bratteteig and Verne ��01�� suggest:
If you see a problem as an entanglement, your only options are to accept or not accept: 
There is no space in between for negotiation and improvement. The notion of entangle-
ment is useful for understanding the “user experience” for the taxpayers calling in to 
TICC. However, we also need the concepts of disentangling and imbrications in order 
for us to talk about space for action and of the possible actions in that space.
Galison’s notion of a trading zone implies that there is a space in which imbrications can and 
do occur. This space is invented when different communities �like taxpayers and tax collectors� 
come in contact around issues of mutual concern. What occurs in this space is conversation. 
Not simply conversations between the people from different communities, though this surely 
happens too, but conversations between the people and the technologies they use to carry out 
there work, as well as conversations between the technologies themselves. This space is where 
the relationship between people’s goals and technology’s features is negotiated. But if one were 
to adopt a metaphor of entanglement as the starting point for sociomaterial explorations, he or 
she would overlook these important conversations altogether because he or she would not ask 
how and why certain sociomaterial practices came to be as they are; they would simply be taken 
as given, both ontologically and empirically. 
Employing the metaphor of imbrication, however, provides a lens for not only recognizing 
that someone is responsible for putting the social and the material together, but that they were 
ever separate in the first place. �cknowledging the empirical separateness and potential imbrica-
tion of these agencies is a necessary move for designing technologies and organizations that work 
better. Indeed, as Bratteteig and Verne ��01�� suggest, from the point of view of human actor, 
“[f ]acing an entanglement seems impossible, facing an imbrication can enable action. Imbrica-
tions that are presented as entanglements not opening up for action seem to counteract the idea 
of a democratic information society.” 
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What Bratteteig and Verne allude to throughout their paper is that some imbrications are 
more tightly interlocked than others – some so tightly interlocked that they may appear to be 
completely entangled. �s Leonardi ��01�a, p. 4�-47� has discussed at some length, imbrications 
are path-dependent and it is through the repetitive interlocking of social and material agencies, 
over time, that some imbrications become more difficult to change than others. The longer the 
history of imbrications that have occurred, the more challenging it will be to remove one tile 
because that tile depends on the structure provided by so many other imbrications of tiles that 
came before, and so many imbrications that have followed depend on it. But it is not impos-
sible. What matters though is one’s ability �indeed, Bratteteig and Verne show that some tax 
collectors have this ability� to see which imbrications can be dismounted easily and which will 
require more work. The skilled operator, be she a tax collector, an engineer, or a theorist will un-
derstand which imbrications present the best and most feasible opportunities for reformulation 
and re-figuration. He or she will be able to tell which conversations can be redone in the space 
of practice so as to arrive at new conclusions. Thus, the possibility for design hinges, theoreti-
cally, on the recognition of sociomaterial practices as imbricated as opposed to entangled, and 
practically on one’s ability to sort out which imbrications can be dismounted and reconstituted 
without causing the entire sociomaterial structure of an organization to collapse.
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